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This paper analyzes the factors that explain earnings in levels and inequality in the urban areas of 
Bolivia, considering not only the usual individual characteristics (education, experience, gender, 
and ethnicity) but also firm characteristics. Given the information available at the firm level in the 
household surveys, two simple models were developed: one for independent workers (for which 
there is relatively detailed firm-level data), and the other for dependent workers (where firm 
variables were approximated by sector, size, and by the legal condition of the workers). The main 
econometric results show that: i) earnings regressions that include only individual variables present 
highly biased (overestimated) coefficients; ii) firm  characteristics are fundamental factors for 
explaining earnings for independent workers, almost doubling R2 and explaining 45.5% of observed 
earnings inequality; and iii) firm proxies for dependent workers are also relevant; however, they 
explain wages at a lower percentage (11.8%), which may be due to non-detailed firm data and to the 
relatively higher importance of education for these workers. These new findings represent a 
contribution to the empirical literature on earnings determinants for urban Bolivia as well as to the 
vision of labor income and poverty problems. 
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I.  Introduction 
Several empirical studies have been developed to analyze the factors that explain urban 
earnings in Bolivia. Generally, the analyses employ variables related to the theory of human 
capital, such as years of schooling and experience, and controls by gender and ethnic wage 
gaps (Pérez de Rada 1997, Fields et al. 1998, Rivero and Jiménez 1999, Moensted 2000, 
Andersen 2001, Andersen and Muriel 2002, Spatz and Steiner 2002, Ramírez 2003, Mercado 
et al. 2003, Muriel 2005a, and Escalante 2004). In many cases, education is pointed out as the 
most important factor, since the rate of return by year is estimated around 9%, accounting for 
most of the explained wage inequality. 
Abowd et al. (1999) and Abowd and Kramarz (1999), however, highlight the importance of 
considering also the heterogeneous components of firm characteristics in empirical analyses of 
wages, and demonstrate that the exclusion of these factors could lead to biases in the 
parameters estimated, due to the omission of variables and/or aggregation problems (use of 
different linear combinations). The inclusion of these variables empirically can be justified by 
relaxing an implicit hypothesis of the human capital theory, which is that the labor market is 
perfect. 
The main restriction to an adequate study of factors that explain earnings, however, rests on 
the need of employer-employee information at the individual level, which in many cases, as in 
that of urban Bolivia, is not available. In this regard, in this paper a new simple methodology is 
proposed, adapted to the information presented in the household surveys. This methodology 
relaxes the hypothesis of a perfect labor market and merges labor personal factors, derived 
from the human capital theory, and firm factors, derived from the firms’ optimization problem. 
In this regard, two simple models were developed to be analyzed empirically. The first one is 
for independent workers − representing 43.1% of the total workers studied − for which there is 
information on production costs and other firm characteristics (besides the usual individual 
variables), permitting a detailed evaluation on earnings determinants. The second model is for 
dependent workers, where firm characteristics are approximated by sector and size as well as 
by the legal condition of the workers. In particular, this paper highlights the relevance of the 
wage gaps by sector and size of the firms, even taking into account years of schooling, which 
supports the alternative hypothesis of imperfections in the labor market. 
Earnings have been estimated in levels and variability considering the decomposition analysis 
of inequality of Shorrocks (1982) and Fields (2002). The empirical analysis confronted three 
econometric problems: multi-collinearity, endogeneity and sample selection bias. The multi-




derived from a translog production function, which has various variables related to the factors 
of production. In this regard, the problem was corrected by using Bierrens’ (2007) procedure, 
by evaluating the robustness of the explanatory variables, and finally by including only the 
factors of production variables that have a low correlation between them and have the highest 
t-values.  The endogeneity problem arises because according to the human capital theory, 
workers’ ability is an omitted variable that is correlated to years of schooling. Consequently, 
instrumental variables were used, estimating the models by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). 
Lastly, the sample selection bias arises because the division in the employed population 
between independent workers and dependent ones implies the use of non-randomly selected 
samples. To correct this bias simultaneously with the endogeneity problem, the Wooldridge 
(2002) approach was used, which combines Heckman’s two-step procedure and instrumental 
variables. 
The econometric results obtained in this paper, by including firm characteristics, significantly 
contribute to the empirical literature on earnings determinants for urban Bolivia, as well as to 
the existing vision of low wages, inequality and poverty problems. First, firm characteristics 
are exposed as fundamental factors for explaining earnings for independent workers: the 
coefficient of determination (R2) almost doubles when these variables are considered in the 
empirical analysis. Additionally, the estimated coefficients of the usual individual variables are 
highly biased (overestimated) when firm characteristics are excluded, confirming the reflection 
of Abowd et al. (1999) and Abowd and Kramarz (1999). In particular, the results show that 
independent workers with up to 12 years of schooling have a rate of return of 3.9% per year of 
education, and those with over 12 years of schooling, a rate of 4.2%. Secondly, firms’ proxies 
for dependent workers are also relevant for explaining wages, and, in the same way as for 
independent workers, the regressions that only consider individual factors present 
overestimated coefficients. 
Finally, the Sorrocks-Fields inequality decompositions for independent workers show that firm 
characteristics  jointly explain 45.5% of earnings inequality (71.2% considering the Fields 
decomposition, which excludes the residuals in the calculation), and years of schooling, 6.6%. 
However, for dependent workers, education is still the most relevant factor explaining earnings 
dispersion, with a contribution of 28.35%, followed by firms’ proxies variables, that jointly 
explain 11.8%. This last result can be attributed to both non-detailed available information at 
the firm level and to the relatively higher importance of education for these workers. 
The paper is divided into five sections, including this introduction. The second section shows 
stylized facts regarding earnings and their interrelation with years of schooling, sectors of 




and dependent workers. The fourth section describes the data, discusses the econometrical 
problems, and presents the empirical estimations. Finally, the last section describes the most 
important conclusions. 
II.  Stylized Facts 
The most important factor of incidence on earnings in urban Bolivia, pointed out by the 
empirical literature, has been education. The returns on years of schooling has been estimated 
around 9% per year (Pérez de Rada 1997, Fields et al. 1998, Rivero and Jiménez 1999, 
Andersen 2001, Andersen and Muriel 2002, Spatz and Steiner 2002, Ramírez 2003, Mercado 
et al. 2003, and Escalante 2004), and usually explains 50% or more of the explained wages 
inequality (Fields et al. 1998, Andersen 2001, and Spatz and Steiner 2002).  
Chart 1: Ln(earnings) per Month by Years of Schooling, 2003-2004 
 
Source: Prepared by author based on Household Survey, 2003-2004. 
Notes: 1) The arrows indicate one positive and negative standard deviation with respect to the average. 2) 
Earnings were adjusted to real values, using the Consumer Price Index, October-November 2004, because 
the survey was conducted in November 2003 and November 2004. 3) The employed population is between 
18 and 65 years of age. 
Indeed, Chart 1 shows the positive relationship between the two variables; however, the 
tendency is non-linear, presenting a higher slope for workers with over 12 years of education 




few studies and controlled in Mincer’s-type regressions (Moensted 2000, and Muriel 2005a)1
Chart 2 shows a high dispersion in years of schooling when taking the average earnings by 
quintile. In particular, data suggests that two individuals with an educational gap of 5 years − 
the first one with 7 and the second with 12 − may earn wages that place both in the first 
quintile (lowest return) or up to the fourth quintile. Additionally, an employee with 10 or 11 
years of schooling may belong to any earning level. 
. 
Worth noting is the high variability of earnings by level of education; for example, an 
individual with a labor income around Bs. 665 per month (ln(665)=6.5) may have zero or up to 
16 years of education. 
Chart 2: Quintiles of Ln(earnings) per Month by Years of 
Schooling, 2003-2004 
 
Source: Prepared by author based on Household Survey, 2003-2004. 
Notes: 1) The arrows indicate one positive and negative standard deviation with respect to the average. 
2) Earnings were adjusted to real values, using the Consumer Price Index of October-November 2004, 
because the survey was conducted in November 2003 and November 2004. 3) The employed population 
is between 18 and 65 years of age. 
                                                        
1 The Household Survey 2003-2004 was chosen because it covered all the months of a year (November 2003-
November 2004) and not only one month (November-December) as in the case of household surveys of other years. 
However, Annex Tables A.1 and A.2, present the econometric results using the survey for 2007, which is the latest 




Other variables have been included in Mincer’s-type regressions to explain the dispersions in 
the relation between earnings and education, the most important of these (besides experience) 
being gender and ethnicity. On the one hand, men earn more than women because of: i) 
occupational segregation problems, where female jobs usually have lower returns; ii) labor cost 
differences, with pregnancy and postpartum benefits given to women workers by their 
employers; iii) still a sharp division of responsibilities at home, where men have to generate 
income to support the family and women have the housework responsibilities, thus working 
less hours and in less hierarchical positions in the labor market; iv) women with less work 
experience as compared to men, not properly accounted for the usual experience variable; and 
v) apparent discrimination problems (Ramírez 2003, and Muriel 2005a). On the other hand, 
the wage gap by ethnicity, disfavoring indigenous people, can be explained by: i) differences in 
educational quality against indigenous people; ii) segmentation problems by sector, where 
indigenous workers are located in low-paid sectors; and iii) possible discrimination problems 
(Rivero and Jiménez 1999, Andersen and Muriel 2002, and Mercado et al. 2003). 
Besides individual characteristics, there are no studies evaluating firm characteristics  as 
determinants of earnings for urban Bolivia2
Chart 3 shows average earnings by sector and years of schooling. On average, earnings and 
years of schooling still have a positive tendency, with sector concentration in both the intensive 
skilled labor sectors
. However, two variables at the firm level can be 
analyzed: sector and size of the firm, given the information available in the household surveys 
for all the employed population. It is worth noting that these variables seem to be important 
for explaining earnings. On the one hand, Muriel and Jemio (2010) describe relevant wages 
gaps by sector, which, in turn, are directly related to labor productivity differences in the way 
predicted by the theory. On the other hand, Muriel (2010) shows that for the Bolivian 
manufacturing sector, wages are positively related to labor productivity, and both variables 
increase as the size of the firm does. 
3 (over 12 years of education) and in the intensive unskilled ones4
                                                        
2 However, in some cases sector dummies were considered. 
 (with up 
to high school completed). However, some sectors present different average earnings with 
similar levels of education and others, similar average earnings with different levels of 
education. Workers in transportation-communications and mining-oil sectors, for example, 
enjoy earnings similar to those belonging to business services, but with lower schooling levels: 
10.2 and 8.1 years respectively, compared to the latter, of 13.9 years. Average labor income in 
3 Includes the sectors of electricity, natural gas and water supply, public administration, business services, social 
and health services, banking, education, and extraterritorial organizations. 
4 Includes the sectors of farming, hotels and restaurants, domestic service, construction, mining and hydrocarbons, 




farming, manufacturing, and commerce sectors are also similar, even though the education 
level in the farming sector is lower. Additionally, the electricity, natural gas and water supply, 
and public administration sectors have higher returns compared with business services, 
although the latter shows more years of education. Finally, average wages between banking 
and education sectors are different but with similar levels of education. 
Chart 3: Ln(earnings) per Month by Sector  
and Years of Schooling, 2003-2004 
 
Source: Prepared by author based on Household Survey, 2003-2004. 
Notes: 1) The bubble size corresponds to the observations size. 2) Earnings were adjusted to real values, using the 
Consumer Price Index of October-November 2004, because the survey was conducted during November 2003 and 
November 2004. 3) The employed population is between 18 and 65 years of age. 
Lastly, Chart 4 shows average earnings of workers by firm size and years  of education 
considering two sector groups following the previous Chart: the first one, called SS, includes 
intensive skill  sectors; and the second one, US, gathers the sectors with the remaining 
employed population (unskilled). In each group, earnings increase with the size of the firms, 
however, the relation with education is less clear. Workers of small and medium firms 
belonging to the US group, for example, have an average wage relatively similar than those of 




to 13.9. Additionally, the average wage of workers of large firms of US is higher than of micro 
firms of SS, although in the latter case the level of education is higher. Finally, in the SS group, 
workers of large firms have the highest average salary, although the levels of education are 
lower when compared to those of medium firms and statistically similar (according to the 
Wald test) to those of micro and small firms. 
In short, the information above shows differences (or similarities) between average wages by 
sector and firm size that are not accurately derived by differences (or similarities) in years of 
schooling. The next section discusses a way to include firm characteristics  as additional 
earnings determinants, adjusted to the information available for the urban Bolivia case. 
Chart 4: Ln(earnings) per Month by Size of  Firm  
and Years of Schooling , 2003-2004 
 
Source: Prepared by author based on Household Survey, 2003-2004. 
Notes: 1) The bubble size corresponds to the observations size. 2) Earnings were adjusted to real values, using 
the Consumer Price Index, October-November 2004, because the survey was conducted in November 2003 
and November 2004. 3) The employed population considered is in between 18 and 65 years of age. 4) GA 






III.   Modeling Earnings Determinants  
III.1.  Empirical Issues 
Abowd et al. (1999) and Abowd and Kramarz (1999) highlight the importance of taking into 
account the heterogeneous components of firm characteristics in empirical analyses of wages 
(besides usual individual characteristics related to the theory of human capital), and 
demonstrate that the exclusion of these factors could lead to high biases in the parameters 
estimated, which are the result of omissions of variables and/or aggregation problems (use of 
different linear combinations). 
The main restriction to an adequate study of the factors that explain earnings, however, rests 
on  the need for information at worker  level  of  both individual characteristics and firm 
characteristics. This data has been available in a few cases, usually for developed countries or 
for specific studies (see, for example, Verner 1999, Jones 2001, Soderbom et al. 2005, Martins 
2008, and Aydemir and Skuterud 2008). In other cases, empirical literature has been creative 
to match the two variable groups at the worker level in order to study different relevant topics 
concerning earnings. Some labor surveys that have firm identifiers have been used to match 
with the corresponding establishment surveys (see, for example, Abowd and Kramarz 1997, 
Abowd et al. 1999, Hellerstein and Neumark 2004, Lallemand et al. 2005, Ilmakunnas and 
Maliranta 2005). Administrative records of workers formally employed  have been also 
matched with the corresponding firms’ information, which in turn is derived from either 
establishment surveys or tax statements (see, for example, Haltiwanger et al 2000, Menezes-
Filho et al. 2006, and Woodcock 2007 and 2008). Some labor surveys have information on the 
type of business or industry and work location of people, which allowed assigning an industry-
location cell for every worker and matching it with firms that also have this information 
(Troske 1995, Hellerstein et al.  1999, Moretti 2004, and Breau and Rigby 2006). Finally, 
available firm characteristics, such as sector, size or work area, have been included in Mincer’s 
type regressions (see, for example, Brown and Medoff 1989, Oi and Idson 1999, Bayard and 
Troske 1999,  Herrera 2003, Muriel 2005a, Temesgen 2005, Lallemand  et al.  2005,  and 
Muravyev 2009). 5
In the case of urban Bolivia, the household surveys have ample information on labor at the 
individual level and include some characteristics of firms, such as size and  sector  for all 
workers and production costs for independent workers. Establishment surveys, in contrast, are 
scarce for the manufacturing sector and almost inexistent for other industries. One advantage, 
however, is that independent workers (that have production cost information) represent a 
  
                                                        




considerable portion of the employed population analyzed, 43.1% for 2003-2004. In  this 
context, a  methodology  is proposed, presented in the next subsection,  considering 
independent workers and dependent workers separately, with specific estimation equations for 
each case. 
III.2.  Methodology 
The empirical relationship between earnings and years of schooling is derived from the theory 
of human capital (Becker  1964), which assumes implicitly that the labor market is perfect: two 
individuals with the same education should have the same wage, and the same marginal 
productivity value as a result of labor market equilibrium, regardless of dissimilar firm 
characteristics. Differences in education are then the source for explaining differences in 
earnings and productivity. The simplest form of the model exposes these results (see Mincer 
1974): the wage gap between choosing s or s  years of education is given by 
(1) 
) ( s s r
s s e w w
− =  
where r>0 is the discount rate, and  s w  ( s w ) is the wage for workers with s (s ) years of 
schooling. Note that if s >s  then  s s w w >  and if s =s  then s s w w = . Expression (1) has been 
refined supposing that marginal returns and costs (or tastes) to schooling are heterogeneous 
between workers, modeling abilities and including other relevant individual characteristics 
(see Mincer 1974 and Card 1999). Nevertheless, for simplicity’s sake without loss of generality, 
it is assumed initially that workers are different only by the years of schooling that they choose 
(this assumption is later relaxed). 
When the labor market is not perfect, however, (1) does not hold because wages can be 
different even for workers with the same education or equal for workers with different years of 
schooling. In this regard, (1) can be redefined in a simple way by supposing what follows. First, 
firms are gathered in  K  groups corresponding to the segmentation groups of the labor market, 
where two groups of firms K and K’ pay different wages for the same level of education, and 
two firms, k and k’, within a group K pay the same wage for the same level of education.  
Second, workers do not know a priori in which group of firms they will work and they form in 
the same way their salary expectations (because in the simple form of the human capital theory 
people finish their formal schooling before entering the labor market). Therefore (1) is 
redefined as: 
(1’) 
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1 π ,  K s w , and  K π   are respectively the salary and  the 
probability of working in a firm k (=1,2, …., kK) belonging to group K(= 1, 2,…,  K ).6
(1”) 
 It is worth 








K s K s g w e w w  
where 
) ( ) (
s s r
s e g
− = ⋅ . Note that under the assumptions made, the human capital theory is valid 
for firms within each group K. The salary  K s w ,  correspond to the workers with s years of 
education and, as will be seen below,  K s w ,
 
can be approximated to the average wage 
corresponding to the average of years of schooling of workers in firm k belonging to K, which, 
in turn, equals the average labor marginal productivity value7
The average labor marginal productivity value is derived considering generic technology of 
production
. 
) ; ( k k F d x for firm k, where  k x represents the vector row of inputs and  k d   the 
vector row of other relevant characteristics of the firms. The maximization problem for firm k 
implies that: 
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where k l x , represents employment,  k ϕ  is the degree of market power,  k p  the level of prices,  k y  
the production volume, and  k l, ε  the employment-product elasticity. Expression (2) can be 
substituted into (1”) to find the wage at the individual level, which is established as a 
proposition. 
Proposition: The wage of the individual i (=1, 2, ..,  ik) with s years of education, that works in 
a firm k from grou 
p K, is determined as: 
                                                        
6 Note that probabilities can change depending on the years of schooling; for example, skilled workers can have a 
greater possibility of working in skill-intensive sectors (if the groups are divided by sectors). However, it is not 
relevant for the methodology proposed because it analyzes wages once workers are in the labor market.    
7 The literature describes many reasons for imperfections in the labor market (such as unions, minimum wages 
applied only to the formal sector, efficient salaries, implicit contracts, etc.) that lead to different wage levels in 
equilibrium. In order to avoid this discussion that leads away from the objective of the paper, it is assumed here that 
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− = ⋅ values the education gap between worker i and employment in the firm 
(on  average) as a result of the marginal productivity gap between them.  
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s i is g g >
  and, at the same time, reflect different years of schooling between 
workers. To illustrate this point, it is assumed that two workers, i and i’, offer one unit of labor. If the 
education levels are higher for the former (s) than for the latter (s’), then in “productivity equivalent 
units” worker i represents more labor units than worker i’ and  (condition 2); for example one 
unit of labor of worker i can represent double that of worker i’, which implies:  ' '
~ 2 ~
s i is g g = . In this regard, 
the wage for worker i is derived from the maximization problem9
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where consequently the following are used: expression (2), condition 1 and expression (1”), from which 
it follows that weights 
) ( ) ( ~ s s r
is is e g g
− = ⋅ = , meeting conditions 1 and 2.   
As mentioned above, from equation (3) two empirical models are constructed according to the 
available data for the urban Bolivia case. The first one corresponds to independent workers; 
that is, self-employed persons, managers or partners, and members of production cooperatives 
that are not salaried employees, and who have information on their own production units. In 
these cases it is possible to have a detailed analysis of variables that explain K is w , . The second 
model corresponds to dependent workers who do not have information at the firm level, but do 
have information on the sector and size of the firms where they work. 
For the first empirical model, equation (3) is redefined considering that the production 
function is a translog, assuming that crossed products between inputs and own characteristics 
do not exist, and applying logarithms: 
(3’)  ∑
≠
+ − + + =
l j
k j j k il l k l k K is x x w , , , 1 , 0 , ln ln ) 1 ( ln ln γ γ ε γ γ  
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8 This approximation follows Trefler (1993).  
9 The derivative between total employment and employment i would be applicable when labor supply is measured in 
hours, workers i (in units) represents a group of workers with the same level of education, or the firm hires an 




where sub-indexes  j,  j’  are attributed to inputs; 0 , 0 ln γ ϕ γ + = k k ;  j j jj ' ' γ γ = ∀  j, j’ and  j≠ 
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j 1 represents the degree of homogeneity of the 
production function (Berndt and Christensen 1973, and Binswanger 1974). 
Since data of firm characteristics is collected at the level of independent workers (one unit of 
employment), it is considered that these represent a kind of employment different from the 
rest, which means separating this employment ( 1 , ≈ k il x ) from the rest of workers, and 
redefining expression (3’) as: 
(3”)  ∑ ∑∑
≠ ≠ ≠
= + + + =
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where it is assumed that K k , 0 , 0 γ γ = , ∀ for all firms k that belong to group K, which means that 
market power is homogeneous among firms belonging to a certain group. 
Function  ) ( ln ⋅ is g  is the well-known Mincer’s-type regression; that is, the part of the wage that 
is explained by observable individual factors. Now the human capital theory (equation (1)) is 
relaxed, allowing to add other individual relevant characteristics and to control for non-
linearity in education returns: 
(4)  ∑ + + + + + = ⋅
n
n i n i i i i is d e e s s g ,
2
4 3 2 2 1 1 0 ) ( ln ξ α α α α α  
where  i s1  and  i s2  are respectively the measures of years of schooling up to 12 years (zero 
otherwise) and over 12 years;  i e   and 
2
i e   represent experience and squared experience of 
worker i;  n i d ,  is the nth relevant attribute of worker i; and the alphas and xs are the coefficients. 
The first empirical model is then established by substituting (4) into (3”): 
(5)  ∑ ∑∑
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= + + + =
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where  0 , 0 , 0
~ α γ γ + = K K  and  i u  is the error term. 
The second empirical model corresponds to dependent workers, where the wage of group K is 
approximated by sector, size and formal condition of the workers (see data description sub-
section). The salary of a worker i is determined by using (3) and (4): 
 (6)  i
n
n i n i i i i K s K is d e e s s w w υ ξ α α α α α α + + + + + + + = ∑ ,
2
4 3 2 2 1 1 , 0 ,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ln ~ ln  
where the alphas and xs are the coefficients to be estimated, and  i υ  is the error term. 
Lastly, equations (5) and (6) are simplified for further discussion: 
(7)  i
m
im m K is x w ν β + =∑
~ ~
,  
where  K is K is w w , , ln ~ = , m β (m=0, 1, 2,.., M) is the estimated coefficient corresponding to the 
explanatory variable  m i x ,
~ , where   1 ,
~
i x =1, and  i ν is the error term. 
III.3. Inequality Decomposition 
A second important issue lies in the decomposition analysis of inequality, which allows 
evaluating the main determinants of earnings inequality. In this regard, the methodologies of 
Shorrocks (1982) and Fields (2002) are used (see also Cowell and Fiorio 2009)10
) ~ (
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define   as the “relative factor inequality weight”, and
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m ,ν are row vectors. Then applying variance to (7) and dividing by ) ~ (w VAR gives 
the inequality decomposition normalized to 1 (or 100%): 
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10 The methodology has been criticized when the dependent variable is in logarithms, which may break up (possibly 
in a rare case) the transfer axiom: if a new distribution is obtained from another one by taking income from the less-
paid worker to the better-paid one, measured inequality should increase. However, in the paper the method is used 
because there is not yet a better methodology for regression-based inequality decomposition (for a discussion of the 


















m ∑ + = β θν . Notice that if the exogenous variables are not 
correlated between them or with the error term, the expressions are reduced respectively to 
) ~ (












= ν θ . Additionally, Fields (2002) ignores the error 
component and re-normalizes (7’) where 100% corresponds to the inequality decomposition of 
the explained dependent variables (corresponding to the coefficient of determination R2). 
IV.  Empirical Analysis 
IV.1. Econometric Issues 
The estimation of the models of earnings determinants presents three potential econometrics 
problems: multi-collinearity (for the case of independent workers), endogeneity and sample 
selection bias. 
The multi-collinearity problem arises because several explanatory variables derived from the 
translog  production function are highly correlated, which tends to inflate the standard 
deviations (deflating the t-values) as well as the coefficient of determination R2. Bierrens 
(2007) shows two possible solutions for this problem. The first one is to reduce the number of 
explanatory variables, by imposing restrictions on the parameters based on the theory. The 
second solution is to delete the variables from the model that cause the problem. Here, the 
second option is chosen because the data is not adequate enough to determine the production 
function structure; for example, the returns of scale (principally the proxy of the capital stock 
that will be described later). Because the t-values cannot be used for analyzing which variables 
should be deleted, Bierrens proposes applying the following steps: i) to choose the least 
relevant variable for the analysis (that is also insignificant); ii) to regress this variable over the 
rest of the explanatory variables; iii) to estimate the residuals (which are not correlated with 
the rest of the explanatory variables); iv) to replace the explanatory variable chosen in i) by the 
residuals estimated in the main regression, which re-parameterizes the model; v) if there are 
some variables that are still insignificant, to repeat the procedure until all the t-values of the 
remaining variables are significant. In addition to Bierrens’ methodology, the robustness of the 
explanatory variables will be analyzed by estimating the model with different sub-groups of 
explanatory variables. 
The endogeneity problem arises because − according to the human capital theory − workers’ 




leads to a biased estimated coefficient for education11. In this regard, instrumental variables 
are used, taking as instruments institutional features of the school system or family 
background, such as the education of parents or spouses. The household surveys used do not 
have this kind of data for all the workers analyzed, so  that alternatively two instrumental 
variables for the urban Bolivia case are proposed corresponding to  the two variables of 
education (see equation 4). The first one is the family average years of schooling. The variable 
is constructed considering the average years of education of the family members of 18 years of 
age or more (excluding the worker), which are categorized as: household head, wife, son or 
daughter, son-in-law or daughter-in-law, and parents. 87% of workers have at least one family 
member (besides themselves) so it was possible to calculate the average years of schooling for 
them. For the remaining 13%, where the workers are the only adults at home, are  other 
relatives or are domestic workers (not belonging to the family) their corresponding years of 
schooling  was used12
Empirically, two additional equations are added for years of schooling with a similar structure:  
. This instrument has a justification similar to that of other family 
variables: education of members of a family are correlated because spouses share mutual 
interests and behaviors, and parents want all their children to reach at least the same level of 
education as they. The second one assumes that most of the employed population had 
restricted access to university (institutional limitations) because: i) universities are located in 
the main cities; ii) universities do not have entrance examinations; however, they are 
economically restricted for poor people (the opportunity cost is very high for them); and iii) 
even some of the employed population that did not completed high school faced location and 
monetary restrictions which limited their access to university.  In this regard, a dummy is 
constructed, being equal to one if the worker is a post-graduate, has completed tertiary school 
at university, or is currently attending university, and zero otherwise. 
(8)  i i i i z z s η δ δ δ + + + = 2 2 1 1 0  
where i i i s s s 2 1 , = ,  i z1  and  i z2 are respectively the family average years of schooling variable and 
the dummy for university, and i η is the error term with the usual properties. In this regard, two 
systems of equations are constructed corresponding to independent and dependent workers 
and used Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). 
                                                        
11 However, where workers have heterogeneous costs and returns, other kinds and causalities of biases arise (see 
Card, 1999). 
12 Many alternatives were evaluated empirically, such as including the workers in the calculation, and/or excluding 




The last apparent econometric problem, sample selection bias, arises because the division of 
the employed population between independent workers and dependent ones implies the use of 
non-randomly selected samples conducting to missing data problems (see Heckman, 1979). To 
correct for this bias, the literature usually uses Heckman’s two-step procedure. However, 
because the models analyzed here have two biases at the same time − endogeneity and sample 
selection − the Wooldridge (2002) approach is used, which combines Heckman’s two-step 
procedure and instrumental variables13
(9) 
. First, a probit model is estimated for independent 
workers (or dependent ones) from the entire urban working-age population (10 or more years 
of age according to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE), as a function of all relevant 
characteristics including the instruments and excluding the years of schooling variables: 
)
~ ~ ' ( )
~ ~ 1 ( i i i q P x ζ x Φ = =
 
where  i q is equal to 1 if the individual in the working age population is an independent worker 
for the model (5) (dependent worker for the model (6)) and is between 18 and 65 years of age 
and zero otherwise, and  i x
~ ~   is a vector of the explanatory relevant variables. Second, the 
estimated coefficients are obtained using all observations, which in turn, are used to estimate 
the inverse Mills ratio  )
~ ~ ' ˆ ( ˆ
i i x ζ λ λ =  for the sub-sample of the working-age population studied.  
Third, (7) is redefined including the inverse Mills ratio: 
(7”)  i i
m
im m K is x w ν λ β β λ
~ ˆ ~ ~
, + + =∑  
Finally, the two equations described by (8) and (7”) are estimated jointly using 2SLS. And, 
statistical tests are estimated to analyze the pertinence of both the endogenous problems, 
through the Hausman test, and the selection problem, by the statistical significance of λ β ˆ . 
Wooldridge shows that this procedure is consistent; however the t-values should still be 
corrected by the “generated regressors problems”. 
IV.2.  Data Description 
The information required to empirically analyze equations (5) and (6) was obtained from the 
Household Survey, 2003-2004. This database is used because it is the richest in information, 
since it was conducted throughout an entire year, November 2003-November 2004, as 
                                                        
13 From a previous use of the methodology;  see, for example, Garcia et al (2001), Das et al (2003), Reza and 




opposed to other household surveys that were conducted only for one month. However, Annex 
Tables A.1 and A.2  present the estimation of both models for the last available official 
Household Survey, 2007, with similar econometric results. The variables related to firm 
characteristics for independent workers (self-employed persons, managers or partners, and 
members of production cooperatives that are not salaried employees) are: 
•  The neperian logarithm of monthly earnings14, which is calculated by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística (INE) and corresponds to the net profit by deducting from the 
gross income all declared costs (payment of salaries, intermediate consumption, service 
expenses, tax payments, and other contributions).  The monthly earnings dispersion 
derived from differences in hours worked per month is controlled by including them 
explicitly in the regressions, hours_month15
•  Ln(product-labor elasticity), which is obtained noting that the elasticity is equal to the 
share of the labor costs over the total cost (see, for example, Yasar et al. 2008), 
approximated by  monthly earnings divided by the gross income. 
. 
•  The factors of production: ln(remaining workers)  estimated as the total number of 
workers in the firm minus one (which corresponds to the independent worker); a proxy 
variable for ln(capital) corresponding to the payments for services such as rent, water, 
electricity, phone, security, and others related; and ln(intermediate consumption) that 
sums up the purchase of raw materials, tools, equipment, and merchandise. 
•  Dummy variables. A dummy for credit (D_credit), equal to one when the independent 
worker declares having obtained a loan in cash for her business in the last 12 months. 15 
dummies for the 16 sectors: farming, mining-oil, commerce, electricity, natural gas and 
water supply, construction, manufacturing, hotels and restaurants, transport and 
communication, banking, business services, public administration, education, social and 
health services, other social services, domestic service, and extraterritorial organizations. 
In this case, these variables would control, among other things, the market power related 
to the sector ( K , 0 γ ).  D_has RUC for firms registered under the Registro Único de 
Contribuyentes, which aims to capture the best productive and demand scenarios that 
motivate independent workers to become formal16
                                                        
14 Wages are determined by month and not by hours, since information on (remaining) employment are in units. 
. A dummy for the main cities, 
15 This variable is also considered for the case of dependent workers. 
16 In Bolivia very few firms are registered with a RUC number (currently NIT) because it generally implies payment 
of several taxes and transaction costs related to public bureaucracy. The advantages of having a RUC are that firms 




D_main cities, equal to one for cities within the central axis — La Paz, Cochabamba, and 
Santa Cruz — and zero otherwise. The variable should be positively related to earnings 
due to higher prices of goods and services in this region, as well as for its relatively 
greater dynamics and economic development17
In the case of dependent workers, the salaries were calculated as the neperian logarithm of 
monthly earnings, estimated by the INE, which includes declared salaries, bonuses, Christmas 
bonuses, primes, etc. The two proxies of firm characteristics are:  
. 
•  Ln(average wages by sector-size), estimated by dividing the earnings of the employed 
population (dependent workers and independent ones) by sector of work (16) and size 
of firm (micro, small, medium, and large). Sizes were accounted for all sectors except 
for banking, public administration, education, social and health services, domestic 
service, and extraterritorial organizations18
•  A dummy D_subject to labor legislation was constructed as firms’ characteristic. This 
variable is a proxy of workers who work under labor legislation; its objective is to 
capture benefits from both having “decent work” and enjoying better productive 
conditions (since formalization of firms can be associated with production 
characteristics that are better and more profitable). In this regard, this variable is 
related to higher personal effort and better production structures. The variable was 
constructed considering workers that both  contribute to the AFPs (Pension Funds 
Administrators) and get Christmas bonus (excluding those from public administration 
which are unstable jobs in Bolivia), and workers that both do domestic services and 
receive Christmas bonus (which have an special labor legislation). 
. The division gave 46 groups for the entire 
sample. 
The variables of individual characteristics include: i) up to 12 years of schooling and over 12 
years of schooling in order to capture the non-linearity of education observed in Chart 1; ii) 
Experience (equal to the worker’s age minus years of schooling minus six) and its square; and 
iii) dummy variables for male condition, D_male, and indigenous condition, D_indigenous 
(measured by the worker native language). Lastly, the probit regressions included also: i) a 
dummy for household head; ii) a dummy for married; iii) a dummy for student; and iv) a ratio 
of children (up to 9 years of age) per adult (over 18 years of age) by house applied only to 
                                                        
17 This variable is also considered for dependent workers. 
18 The banking sector was not divided by size due to few observations, nor were the remaining sectors, since they are 





women, which is as a proxy variable of caring for children at home and has a negative effect on 
female participation in the labor force (see Muriel 2005b).  
The variables were constructed for workers ages 18 to 65 that declared a positive labor income 
(excluding some extreme values). The data was adjusted to real values on the basis of the 
Consumer Price Index, October-November 2004 since the survey was conducted between 
November 2003 and November 2004.  Summary statistics for independent and dependent 
workers are given in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Independent Workers  
(4251 observations, 43.1% of the sample) 





       
Ln(earnings)  6.477  0.959  0.148 
Years of schooling  8.172  4.862  0.595 
Proportion: workers with years of schooling up to 12  0.836      
Proportion: workers over 12 year of schooling  0.164       
Family average years of schooling  8.910  4.494   0.504  
Proportion: dummy for university equal 1  0.112       
Experience  25.866  13.672  0.529 
[Experience]2  855.956  780.417  0.912 
Proportion of males  0.502     
Proportion of indigenous  0.378     
Hours_month  194.941  103.354  0.530 
Ln(employment-product elasticity)  -0.691  0.639  -0.924 
Ln(remaining workers)  0.313  0.943  3.016 
Ln(capital)  1.081  2.140  1.980 
Ln(intermediate consumption)  4.960  2.990  0.603 
Ln(capital)xln(intermediate consumption)  7.061  15.393  2.180 
Ln(capital)xln(remaining workers)  0.451  2.038  4.514 
Ln(intermediate consumption))xln(remaining workers)  1.609  5.210  3.238 
[Ln(capital)]
2  5.748  12.826  2.231 
[Ln(intermediate consumption)]
2  33.542  24.845  0.741 
[Ln(remaining workers)]
2  0.986  5.554  5.633 
Proportion: dummy has RUC equal 1  0.131     
Proportion: dummy credit equal 1  0.182     
Proportion: dummy main cities equal 1  0.567     
Proportion: dummy household head equal 1  0.589     
Proportion: dummy married equal 1  0.752     
Proportion: dummy student equal 1  0.068     








Table 2: Summary Statistics for Dependent Workers  
(5608 observations, 56.9% of the sample) 





       
Ln(earnings)  6.849  0.867  0.127 
Years of schooling  11.152  4.647  0.417 
Proportion: workers with years of schooling up to 12  0.604      
Proportion: workers over 12 year of schooling  0.396     
Family average years of schooling  9.981  4.607  0.462 
Proportion: dummy for university equal 1  0.248     
Experience  16.991  11.960  0.704 
[Experience]2  431.715  545.692  1.264 
Proportion of males  0.621     
Proportion of indigenous  0.211     
Hours_month  204.616  86.726  0.424 
Ln(average wages by sector-size)  7.214  0.473  0.066 
Proportion: dummy subject to labor legislation equal 1  0.326     
Proportion: dummy main cities equal 1  0.577     
Proportion: dummy household head equal 1  0.538     
Proportion: dummy married equal 1  0.625     
Proportion: dummy student equal 1  0.167     
Ratio of children per adult for women  0.071  0.149  2.117 
 
IV.3.  Econometric results 
Table 3 shows the results of the empirical analysis on earnings determinants for independent 
workers. The first three regressions include only the observable individual characteristics, 
which are related to the theory of human capital: regression (1) is the OLS estimation, (2) 
corrects for endogeneity bias, and (3) corrects for endogeneity and sample selection biases at 
the same time. The coefficients estimated show the expected signs, in all cases being consistent 
with those preciously found in the literature: years of schooling  have a positive effect on 
earnings with a rate of return higher for workers with higher years of education – over 12, and 
experience also presents a positive relationship with decreasing marginal returns. Additionally, 
gender and ethnicity dummies show that males earn more than females and that the 
indigenous population earns less than the non-indigenous one. It is worth noting that both 




by the Hausman test and the later evaluating the significance of the coefficient of the inverse 
Mills ratio19
Regressions (4) to (6) add to the analysis of the firm characteristics. Initially the multi-
collinearity problem was evaluated. In this regard, using the Bierrens (2007) procedure, only 
one variable was excluded: ln(capital)×ln(remaining workers). However, because of the high 
correlation between some factor of production variables, and in order not to overestimate the 
firm characteristics, nor the coefficient of determination used for the decomposition analysis, 
only the factor of production variables that have a low correlation between them and have the 
highest t-values in the regressions were included. Additionally, the reaming variables included 
were those that were significant up to a level of 10%. 
. 
Table 3: Ln(earnings) Determinants per Month  
for Independent Workers, 2003-2004 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  OLS  IV (2SLS)  IV plus 
Heckman 
OLS  IV (2SLS)  IV plus 
Heckman 
 













  (9.54)  (7.58)  (6.67)  (5.90)  (4.89)  (4.24) 
Over 12 year of schooling  0.058  0.091  0.090  0.024  0.041  0.041 
  (15.53)  (13.60)  (13.38)  (7.81)  (7.12)  (7.07) 
Experience  0.032  0.036  0.025  0.019  0.0208  0.0140 
  (8.93)  (9.89)  (6.39)  (6.98)  (7.46)  (4.79) 
[Experience]2  -0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0002 
  (-7.85)  (-6.76)  (-4.46)  (-6.11)  (-5.28)  (-3.47) 
D_male  0.480  0.409  0.364  0.275  0.242  0.2155 
  (19.04)  (13.95)  (12.23)  (12.18)  (9.87)  (8.71) 
D_indigenous  -0.198  -0.083  -0.172  -0.125  -0.073  -0.127 
  (-7.32)  (-2.41)  (-4.65)  (-6.41)  (-2.94)  (-4.77) 
Hours_month  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.001  0.002  0.001 
  (4.87)  (4.37)  (-0.37)  (15.23)  (15.35)  (15.16) 
Ln(employment-product elasticity)         0.931  0.920  0.916 
         (19.49)  (18.97)  (18.96) 
Ln(remaining workers)         0.128  0.131  0.130 
         (11.17)  (11.39)  (11.32) 
[ln(capital)]2         0.012  0.011  0.0112 
         (14.82)  (14.39)  (14.20) 
                                                        
19 As far as is known, only one paper (Escalante, 2004) corrects for endogeneity for the urban Bolivia case, but no 




[ln(intermediate consumption)]2         0.034  0.034  0.034 
         (28.72)  (27.69)  (27.63) 
D_electric power, gas, and water        0.291  0.275  0.387 
        (6.77)  (5.51)  (7.35) 
D_construction        0.780  0.780  0.7708 
        (18.25)  (18.19)  (18.22) 
D_ transport and communication        0.201  0.193  0.196 
        (5.44)  (5.16)  (5.27) 
D_banking        0.789  0.735  0.7098 





Table 3 continuation 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  OLS  IV (2SLS)  IV plus 
Heckman 










        (6.92)  (6.32)  (6.30) 
D_ Other social services        0.155  0.171  0.169 
        (3.21)  (3.54)  (3.53) 
D_has RUC        0.204  0.181  0.1753 
        (5.90)  (5.12)  (5.0) 
D_credit        0.043  0.041  0.035 
        (1.99)  (1.85)  (1.61) 
Inverse Mills ratio      -0.374       -0.2283 
      (-7.17)       (-5.99) 
Constant  4.871  4.372  5.124  4.910  4.657  5.115 
  (69.590)  (36.30)  (32.17)  (86.57)  (48.80)  (42.57) 
             
R2  0.34  0.32  0.33  0.64  0.63  0.64 
Observations  4251  4251  4251  4251  4251  4251 
Notes: 1) In brackets are the t-statistic values calculated from the robust variance-covariance matrix; 2) regressions 
were estimated from the Household Survey 2003-2004, using monthly data; 3) only the variables significant at the 10% 
level were included; 4) the probit  model (for calculating the inverse Mills ratio) included the following significant 
variables: D_male, D_indigenous, dummy for household head, dummy for married, dummy for student, and the ratio of 
children per adult. 
 
Regression (4) presents the estimation using OLS, and (5) and (6) correct, respectively, by 
endogeneity bias and both biases. In general, all coefficients show the expected signs. In 
particular, from the last regression the following aspects related to firm characteristics can be 
highlighted: 
•  Ln(remaining workers) shows a positive and relatively high coefficient, which can be 
associated with the size of the firm: an increase in 1% in this kind of employment is 
associated to an earnings increase of approximately 0.13%. 
•  The proxy variable of capital has a positive effect on earnings; however,  the elasticity is 
relatively low on average − (0.024)−0.011×2×ln(capital) 20
                                                        
20 Ln(capital) corresponds to the average sample. 
 − which may be due to both a 
low use of this factor of production and the proxy  used that can underestimate  the 
elasticity. It is worth noting, however, that the dispersion of this variable is high (see 
Tables 1 and 2), leading to a substantially higher elasticity for the highest decile of the 




•  The earnings-intermediate consumption elasticity shows a high value21
•  The credit dummy shows a significant positive coefficient, proving that, ceteris paribus, 
access to physical and operating capital improves the earnings median by  approximately 
3.6%, (e0.035-1)×100. 
; with an increase 
of 1% in this kind of expense is associated to an increase of 0.50% in labor income. 
•  The dummy equal to one when the firm is registered in the RUC, D_has RUC, has a 
positive and high impact, increasing the earnings median by approximately 19.2%, (e0.175-
1)×100, reflecting — as pointed out above — a better production base in terms of basic 
management skills, structures, and processes. 
•  Lastly, the wage gaps by sectors are significant in some cases, with the estimated high 
values of the coefficients of banking and construction standing out. These factors would 
be  explaining the differences in market power  but also differences in production 
processes by sector. 
The consideration of firm characteristics in the regressions on earnings seems fundamental for 
independent workers: comparing regressions (3) with (6), two main differences arise. First the 
coefficient of determination (R2) almost doubles in regression (6), when firm characteristics 
are included, even though not all the significant factors of production variables were included 
because of multi-collinearity problems. Second, the coefficients related with individual 
characteristics are exposed as highly biased when firm characteristics are excluded, confirming 
the observation of Abowd  et al.  (1999) and Abowd and Kramarz (1999) regarding to the 
variables omission problems. In particular, regression (3) predicts that for workers with up to 
12 years of schooling, an additional year of schooling would increase earnings by 8.1%, (e0.078-
1)×100, while in (6) the estimated increase reaches only 3.9% (less than half). Education 
returns for workers with superior education are in both regressions higher compared to the 
rest of workers, however the gap between the estimations is also high (a difference of 5.2% in 
the rate of return).  
In general, the values of the coefficients of individual characteristics are overestimated when 
firm characteristics are excluded, which is the result of the relation between the two types of 
variables (see Abowd et al. 1999): intuitively individual characteristics would also explain firm 
                                                        
21 In this case, elasticity is equal to: 0.034×2×ln(intermediate consumption), where the variable corresponds to the 




characteristics  when these last variables are not included in earnings regressions22
Regressions (7) to (12) in Table 4 present the econometric results for dependent workers. The 
last three regressions include firm characteristics that have been narrowed down by the proxy 
ln(average wages by sector-size) and by a dummy for workers subject to labor legislation. In 
the same way as for independent workers, the Hausman test and the significance of the inverse 
Mills ratio coefficient show, respectively, that endogeneity and sample selection bias are 
important, with (8) and (11) being corrected by endogeneity and (9) and (12) by both biases. 
.  For 
example, independent workers with more years of schooling usually belong to richer families 
and/or have greater savings from previous jobs, which places them in an advantageous 
position in the acquisition of factors of production, both in quantity and quality. 
Table 4: Ln(Earnings) Determinants per Month for  
Dependent Workers, 2003-2004 
Explanatory variables  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  OLS  IV (2SLS)  IV plus 
Heckman 
OLS  IV (2SLS)  IV plus 
Heckman 
  













  (19.30)  (10.02)  (8.23)  (8.83)  (4.33)  (3.20) 
Over 12 year of schooling  0.100  0.136  0.128  0.070  0.102  0.096 
  (43.99)  (23.19)  (21.70)  (14.04)  (9.98)  (9.67) 
Experience  0.055  0.055  0.045  0.043  0.045  0.036 
  (23.42)  (22.99)  (17.21)  (11.60)  (10.77)  (9.0) 
[Experience]2  -0.0008  -0.0007  -0.0005  -0.0006  -0.0006  -0.0005 
  (-15.29)  (-11.90)  (-9.93)  (-9.32)  (-9.03)  (-7.68) 
D_male  0.282  0.261  0.127  0.249  0.252  0.130 
  (15.12)  (12.97)  (5.02)  (7.64)  (7.95)  (5.25) 
D_indigenous  -0.116  -0.009  0.051  -0.114  -0.035  0.022 
  (-5.60)  (-0.35)  (1.96)  (-4.31)  (-1.14)  (0.67) 
Hours_month  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (16.15)  (16.93)  (16.11)  (6.87)  (6.27)  (5.67) 
Ln(average wages by groups)         0.361  0.264  0.248 
         (11.36)  (8.04)  (7.57) 
D_subject to labor legislation        0.361  0.285  0.279 
        (6.15)  (3.95)  (3.71) 
Inverse Mills ratio      -0.350      -0.326 
      (-8.48)      (-5.73) 
Constant  4.771  4.190  4.950  2.498  2.735  3.535 
                                                        
22  According to Abowd  et al., exclusion of firm variables implies that the estimated coefficients of individual 
variables sum both effects, individual plus (employment weighted average) firm effects, considering that the 




  (92.850)  (37.780)  (34.22)  (10.16)  (9.04)  (14.48) 
             
R2  0.44  0.41  0.43  0.50  0.49  0.50 
Observations  5608  5608  5608  5608  5608  5608 
Notes: 1) In brackets are the t-statistic values calculated from the robust variance-covariance matrix; 2) standard errors 
were corrected by intra-group correlation derived from average wages (46 clusters); 3) regressions were estimated 
from the Household Survey 2003-2004 using monthly data; 4) only the variables significant at the 10% level were 
included; 5) the probit model (for calculating the inverse Mills ratio) included the following significant variables: D_male, 
D_indigenous, dummy for household head, dummy for married, dummy for student, and the ratio of children per adult. 
In general, all the coefficients have the expected signs and are significant at least at 10%, with 
the exception of D_indigenous, being in some cases insignificant and in others having the 
opposite sign of that expected (regression (9)). The inclusion of firms’ variables improves the 
coefficient of determination by more than 13%, and shows that: first —  on average —  the 
logarithm of individual wages is composed at a level of 24.8% by the logarithm of earnings by 
sector and size; and, second, D_subject to labor legislation has a positive and high impact, 
increasing the median of earning by approximately 32.3%, (e0.279-1)×100, which can be related 
to both higher individual effort  (giving better labor conditions) and better production 
structures for working. 
In the same way as for independent worker, the regressions that only consider individual 
characteristics present overestimated coefficients. In particular, an increase in one year of 
schooling is associated to an increase of 10.1% in earnings for workers with up to 12 years of 
education and by 13.7% for workers with over 12 years in regression (9), with these rates being 
6.1% and 10.1% respectively in the last regression (considering firm characteristics). Lastly, in 
(12) the insignificance of the dummy for “indigenous” may correspond to the inclusion of the 
variable  ln(average wages by sector-size), which in some way controls the segmentation 
problem by sector where indigenous workers are located in low-paid sectors (see Mercado et 
al. 2003). 
As in the case of independent workers, the overestimation of the coefficients of individual 
characteristics is the result of their relation with firm characteristics. Intuitively, for example, 
years of schooling presents a positive correlation with the size of firms, suggesting that firms 
are more intensive in skilled workers as they become larger (possibly because they corresponds 
to sub-sectors more intensive in capital). Additionally, the variable  D_subject to labor 
legislation is positively related to over 12 years of schooling and negatively related to years of 
schooling up to 12, which suggest that formal firms tend to hire skilled workers because they 
are both more intensive in this kind of work (such as for example firms belonging to the 
electricity, natural gas and water supply, public administration, banking, and education 




Finally, Table 5 presents earnings inequality decompositions from the estimated regressions 
that control for endogeneity and sample selection biases. When the regressions consider only 
individual characteristics − regressions (3) for independent workers and (9) for dependent 
ones − the results are similar to the previous findings, where education was the most relevant 






Table 5: Shorrocks and Fields Earnings Inequality  
Decompositions for Dependent and Independent Workers 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Independent Workers  Dependent Workers 

















                 
Years of schooling  13.62%  41.16%  6.62%  10.36%  33.16%  76.58%  28.35%  57.04% 
Experience  -0.56%  -1.71%  -0.25%  -0.40%  5.06%  11.70%  4.19%  8.44% 
D_male  6.34%  19.15%  3.94%  6.16%  0.90%  2.09%  0.97%  1.95% 
D_indigenous  1.51%  4.57%  1.17%  1.84%  -0.37%  -0.86%  -0.17%  -0.34% 
Hours_month  12.21%  36.89%  5.96%  9.33%  0.98%  2.26%  1.06%  2.14% 
Production variables      40.32%  63.10%         
Ln(average wages by sector-size)              5.91%  11.89% 
Dummies of sectors      2.92%  4.57%         
D_subject to labor legislation              5.90%  11.87% 
D_has RUC      2.12%  3.31%         
D_credit      0.17%  0.26%         
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.02%  -0.07%  0.93%  1.46%  3.56%  8.22%  3.48%  7.01% 
Residuals  66.90%     36.10%    56.70%    50.30%   
                 
Total  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00% 
Notes: 1) The first two columns are calculated from regression (3) from Table 3 and the second two from (6); 2) columns (e) and (f) were calculated from 
regression (9) of Table 4, and the last two columns from (12); 3) years of schooling variables were considered instead of their corresponding instrumental 
variables; and 4) years of schooling aggregates the variables years of schooling up to 12 and over 12 year of schooling, Experience aggregates its value in levels 








In this regard, the Fields decomposition (columns (b) and (f) of Table 5) shows that years of 
schooling  explains 41.2% of the explained earnings inequality for independent  workers and 
76.6% for dependent ones.  However,  these high percentages are partly explained by  the 
exclusion of the residuals in the Fields calculation, which are relevant in both cases (66.9% and 
56.7% respectively). Therefore, using the Shorrocks-Fields decomposition, the variable fails to 
explain 13.6% of earnings inequality for independent workers and 33.2% for dependent ones.  
The calculation of the regressions that also considers firm characteristics  −  (6) and (12) − 
exposes a different scenario, mainly for independent workers. In this case, the Shorrocks 
decomposition (column (c) of Table 5) shows that production variables − Ln(product-labor 
elasticity) plus the factor of production variables − explain 40.3% of the earnings dispersion, 
and all firm characteristics, where together production variables, Dummies of sectors, D_has 
RUC  and  D_credit, explain 45.5% (71.2% considering the Fields decomposition). Individual 
characteristics lose their explicative power; in particular, the coefficient of years of schooling 
falls to about half, explaining now only 6.6% of earnings inequality. 
Lastly, in the case of dependent workers, firm characteristics proxies jointly explain 11.8% of 
earnings. Years of schooling also loses its explicative power from 33.16% to 28.35% (columns (e) 
and (g)); however, it continues to be the most important factor, which can be attributed to both 
non-detailed available information at the firm level for this population and to the relatively 
higher importance of education for these workers. 
In short, the decompositions show that firm characteristics for explaining earnings inequality 
are relevant, being essential for independent workers. Additionally, education loses its 
explicative power when firm characteristics  are included in the regressions, which can 
correspond − as discussed above − to its relation with firm characteristics. 
V.  Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the factors that explain earnings in the urban areas of Bolivia, considering 
both individual variables (usually related to the human capital theory) and firm characteristics. 
Initially it can be observed on average —  through simple charts —  that there is a positive 
relationship between education and earnings under a non-linear structure; however, 
highlighting a high dispersion. Two variables at the firm level, sector and size, are then added to 
try to explain part of these dispersions, which are not accurately derived by differences (or 
similarities) in years of schooling. 
In this regard, a new simple methodology is proposed, adapted to the information presented in 





relaxes the hypothesis of a perfect labor market and merges a simple specification of the human 
capital theory and the firms’ optimization problem from which follows the labor marginal 
productivity value. Two simple models are derived from this methodology to be analyzed 
empirically. The first one corresponds to independent workers, representing 43.1% of the total 
workers studied, for which there is information on production costs and other firm 
characteristics  (besides the usual individual variables), allowing a detailed evaluation of 
earnings determinants. The second one is for dependent workers, where firm characteristics are 
approximated by sector and size as well as by the legal condition of the workers. 
Earnings are estimated in levels and variability considering the decomposition analysis of 
inequality of Shorrocks (1982) and Fields (2002). The empirical analysis confronted three 
econometric problems: multi-collinearity, endogeneity and sample selection bias. Multi-
collinearity arises for the model of independent workers because firm characteristics  were 
derived from a translog production function, which has various variables related with the factors 
of production. In this regard, the problem was corrected by using the Bierrens (2007) 
procedure, by evaluating the robustness of the explanatory variables, and finally by including 
only the factors of production variables that have a low correlation between them and have the 
highest t-values (in order to not overestimate the firm characteristics  or the coefficient of 
determination used for the inequality decomposition analysis).  The endogeneity problem arises 
because, according to the human capital theory, workers’ ability is an omitted variable that is 
correlated to years of schooling. Consequently, instrumental variables were used, estimating the 
models by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). Lastly, the sample selection bias arises because the 
division of the employed population between independent workers and dependent ones implies 
the use of non-randomly selected samples leading to missing data problems (see Heckman, 
1979). To correct this bias simultaneously with the endogeneity problem, the Wooldridge (2002) 
approach was used, which combines Heckman’s two-step procedure and instrumental variables. 
The empirical analysis leads to the results that follow for independent workers. First, firm 
characteristics  are exposed as fundamental factors for explaining earnings, highlighting the 
intermediate consumption and (remaining) employment, where an increase of 1% is related to 
an increase of 0.50% and 0.13% respectively. Additionally, the dummies for credit and firm’s 
registration in the RUC increase the median of earnings by 3.6% and 19.2% respectively, 
reflecting the importance of access to physical and operating capital, as well as better production 
bases (management skills, structures, and processes).  
Second, firm characteristics seem fundamental for explaining earnings in the urban Bolivia case: 
the coefficient of determination (R2) almost doubles when these variables are included in the 





exposed as highly biased (overestimated) when only these variables are considered, confirming 
the observation of Abowd et al. (1999) and Abowd and Kramarz (1999) regarding the variables 
omission problems. In particular, the education rate of return is estimated at 8.1% for workers 
with up to 12 years of schooling and 9.4% for the rest (over 12 year of schooling) compared to 
the estimated rates of 3.9% and 4.2% when firm characteristics  are included. Finally, the 
Shorrocks-Fields decomposition shows that individual factors lose their explicative power when 
firm characteristics are considered. Additionally, these last variables jointly explain 45.5% of 
earnings inequality (71.2% considering the Fields decomposition), followed by education, that 
explains 6.6%. 
In the case of dependent workers, the results that follow arise. First, the inclusion of firms’ 
variables improves the coefficient of determination by more than 13%, and shows that — on 
average and in logarithms — 24.8% of wages are composed by earnings by sector and size, and 
the median of earnings increases to approximately 32.3% for workers subject to labor 
legislation. Second, in the same way as for independent workers, the regressions that only 
consider individual factors present overestimated coefficients. In particular, an increase in one 
year of schooling is associated to an increase in 10.1% of earnings for workers with up to 12 years 
of education and in 13.7% for workers with over 12 years, and decreases to 6.1% and 10.1% when 
firm characteristics are included. In this case individual characteristics would also represent 
firm characteristics in earnings regressions where the last variables are not considered. 
Lastly, the Shorrocks-Fields decomposition analysis shows that years of schooling remains in 
first place, explaining 28.35% of earnings inequality, followed by firm characteristics proxies 
that jointly explain 11.8%, which can be attributed to both non-detailed available information at 
the firm level for this population, and to the relatively higher importance of education for these 
workers. 
In short, the empirical analysis developed shows that firm characteristics, as determinants of 
earnings in levels and in inequality, are fundamental for independent workers and relevant for 
dependent  workers; and that for both categories of workers their exclusion leads to highly 
biased estimations in earnings regressions. These new findings represent a new contribution to 
the empirical literature on earnings determinants for urban Bolivia, as well as to the vision 
regarding low wages, inequality and poverty problems. 
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Table A.1: Ln(Earnings) Determinants per Month  
for Independent Workers, 2007  
Explanatory variables  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
  OLS  IV (2SLS)  IV+Heck.  OLS  IV (2SLS)  IV+Heck. 
Years of schooling  0.047  0.080  0.081  0.017  0.029  0.030 
  (7.28)  (8.29)  (8.46)  (3.45)  (3.60)  (3.74) 
Experience  0.019  0.022  0.016  0.014  0.015  0.011 
  (3.05)  (3.62)  (2.37)  (3.08)  (3.37)  (2.38) 
[Experience]2  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0001 
  (-2.24)  (-1.82)  (-0.97)  (-2.43)  (-2.26)  (-1.52) 
D_male  0.4679  0.4169  0.3821  0.2348  0.2193  0.1971 
  (9.81)  (8.49)  (7.41)  (5.78)  (5.30)  (4.52) 
D_indigenous  -0.137  -0.056  -0.087  -0.130  -0.105  -0.1236 
  (-2.56)  (-0.97)  (-1.45)  (-3.46)  (-2.62)  (-2.93) 
Hours_month  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (10.53)  (10.26)  (10.07)  (5.27)  (5.34)  (5.24) 
Ln(product-labor elasticity)        0.910  0.908  0.908 
        (22.53)  (22.60)  (22.53) 
Ln(remaining workers)         0.521  0.520  0.5223 
         (8.83)  (8.92)  (8.95) 
Ln(remaining workers)         -0.039  -0.039  -0.040 
×ln(intermediate consumption)         (-3.63)  (-3.65)  (-3.68) 
[ln(capital)]2         0.014  0.014  0.0137 
         (11.42)  (10.72)  (10.59) 
[ln(intermediate consumption)]2         0.033  0.033  0.033 
         (26.50)  (26.34)  (26.28) 
D_construction         0.866  0.869  0.870 
         (10.96)  (11.01)  (11.11) 
D_ transport and communication        0.238  0.234  0.2351 
        (4.53)  (4.45)  (4.47) 
D_banking        2.589  2.590  2.614 
        (40.15)  (40.25)  (38.93) 
D_business services        0.568  0.517  0.5190 
        (6.16)  (5.37)  (5.38) 
Inverse Mills ratio      -0.202       -0.122 
      (5.18)       (-1.68) 
Constant  5.229  4.820  5.179  5.085  4.952  5.166 
  (43.79)  (33.43)  (22.13)  (55.59)  (44.04)  (30.37) 
             





Observations  1615  1615  1615  1615  1615  1615 
Notes: 1) in brackets are the t-statistic values calculated from the robust variance-covariance matrix; 2) the years of 
schooling showed linear tendency for this group of workers, even though the two instrumental variables were used; 3) 
the  probit  model (for calculating the inverse Mills ratios) included the following significant variables:  D_male, 





Table A.2: Ln(Earnings) Determinants per Month  
for Dependent Workers, 2007 
Explanatory variables  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22)  (23)  (24) 
  OLS  IV (2SLS)  IV+Heck.  OLS  IV (2SLS)  IV+Heck. 
Years of schooling up to 12  0.056  0.104  0.078  0.036  0.069  0.047 
  (10.96)  (5.18)  (3.84)  (3.77)  (2.97)  (1.95) 
Over 12 years of schooling  0.080  0.112  0.101  0.054  0.084  0.076 
  (23.26)  (10.83)  (9.83)  (7.37)  (6.35)  (5.92) 
Experience  0.051  0.051  0.040  0.042  0.044  0.034 
  (16.26)  (16.15)  (11.84)  (12.23)  (12.63)  (10.95) 
[Experience]2  -0.0007  -0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0004 
  (-10.25)  (-7.34)  (-5.88)  (-8.14)  (-6.48)  (-4.90) 
D_male  0.322  0.300  0.149  0.261  0.262  0.126 
  (12.03)  (10.11)  (4.16)  (7.63)  (7.31)  (2.74) 
D_indigenous  -0.136  -0.070  0.033  -0.139  -0.083  0.011 
  (-3.86)  (-1.74)  (0.81)  (-4.36)  (-2.55)  (0.29) 
Hours_month  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (9.94)  (10.64)  (10.38)  (5.24)  (5.33)  (4.89) 
Ln(average wages by groups)         0.371  0.298  0.284 
         (5.93)  (3.90)  (4.02) 
D_subject to labor legislation        0.283  0.207  0.190 
        (4.69)  (3.19)  (2.94) 
Inverse Mills ratio      -0.419      -0.377 
      (-7.80)      (-5.79) 
Constant  5.251  4.713  5.596  2.797  2.898  3.777 
  (69.80)  (24.380)  (24.82)  (5.25)  (4.11)  (6.35) 
             
R2  0.39  0.37  0.40  0.46  0.44  0.46 
Observations  2433  2433  2433  2433  2433  2433 
Notes: 1) in brackets are the t-statistic values calculated from the robust variance-covariance matrix; 2) the probit 
model (for calculating the inverse Mills ratios) included the following significant variables: D_male, D_indigenous, 
dummy for household head, dummy for married, a dummy for student, a dummy for migrant and the ratio of children 
per adult. 
 
 